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COMMENTS 
NLRB Discovery Practice: The Applicability of 
the Discovery Provisions of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 
Pretrial discovery generally serves two purposes: (1) to nar- 
row and clarify the issues between the adverse parties, and (2) to 
ascertain the facts relative to those issues and to produce infor- 
mation concerning the existence or location of relevant facts.l The 
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 have 
proven effective in serving these purposes in civil actions in the 
federal district  court^.^ In administrative adjudications, however, 
discovery-type procedures have received a mixed response.' In 
particular, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the 
Board) has consistently opposed the adoption of discovery rules 
for administrative adjudicatory proceedings authorized by the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) .5 That policy has not 
gone without challenge, however; NLRB Chairman Murphy, for 
example, has suggested that full disclosure in accord with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be required of all parties in any 
NLRB proceeding! 
This comment examines NLRB discovery by reviewing the 
present law of discovery in the collective bargaining context, by 
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 
2. These rules were first promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in 1938. 
308 U.S. 645 (1939); FED. R. CIV. P. 86(a). Rules 26-37 are the general discovery provisions; 
these provisions were amended substantially in 1970. 398 U.S. 977 (1970). 
3. See Jenkins, Jenkins Proposals for Changes in NLRB Procedures, 45 L.R.R.M. 94, 
101 (1960). For a discussion of the effectiveness of these federal discovery provisions, see 
Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132 (1951); 
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAW. L. REV. 940 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 
Developments-Discovery] . 
The federal discovery provisions have been lauded for assisting trial preparation, 
minimizing the risk of surprise, reducing the number of controverted issues, and increas- 
ing the possibility of pretrial settlements. At the same time, discovery has been sharply 
criticized for imposing disproportionate burdens of cost and inconvenience on the parties, 
encroaching upon personal or professional privileges, allowing harassment, fostering 
delay, and inducing injudicious settlements. Id. at 942. 
4. See notes 81-94 and accompanying text infra. 
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970). The present NLRA consists primarily of the Wagner 
Act, Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449, as amended by Labor Management Relations 
(Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. 
6. Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB. L. REP. (1975-76 NLRB Dec.) 
7 16,814, a t  27,771 n.7 (May 28, 1976) (dissenting opinion). 
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discussing the arguments made by proponents and opponents of 
adoption of discovery rules, and by analyzing the specific applica- 
bility of the federal rules' discovery provisions7 to NLRB proceed- 
ings. 
I. DISCOVERY IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTEXT 
A. The Need for Information 
During collective bargaining and contract administration, 
representatives of both labor and management frequently need 
certain information that is possessed by the other party or the 
NLRB. For example, in attempting to negotiate a favorable wage- 
and-benefit package, a union may desire the results of an 
'industry-wide wage survey made by an employer. Or, in order to 
insure that all employees are included in an appropriate bargain- 
ing unit, a union may need a list of job descriptions or classifica- 
tions of all employees. Conversely, an employer may desire union 
records to verify whether a union's request that an employee be 
discharged for being delinquent in payment of dues is justified. 
An employer might also desire amplification of facts surrounding 
an incident that resulted in an employee's grievance. In addition, 
an employer or a union charged with an unfair labor practice may 
need information known only by the NLRB or the charging party 
in order to prepare a defense to the charge. 
The need for information in the labor context can be classi- 
fied as either subsidiary or primary. A need for data relevant and 
necessary to a collateral dispute might be termed subsidiary. A 
typical example is when the need for information arises during 
the processing of a dispute through the grievance procedure; i.e., 
a union may seek information in the employer's possession relat- 
ing to a union member for whom the union is pursuing a griev- 
ance. Also included in this category is the situation where the 
respondent to an unfair labor practice complaint desires state- 
ments in the Board's possession that were made by potential 
witnesses. The term primary might be used to characterize in- 
stances in which the need for information is the heart of the 
dispute itself. For instance, a union may need certain economic 
data in order to carry out its statutory obligation of effective 
7. The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CN. P. 
26-37, are herein referred to as the federal rules or the federal discovery rules. 
8. This comment is limited to the discussion of unfair labor practice and related 
proceedings. Other Board proceedings authorized by the NLRA, such as representation 
and referendum procedures, are not treated. 
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representation during bargaining. The employer's refusal to sup- 
ply such information voluntarily may lead to an unfair labor 
practice charge. 
B. Present Practice, Law, and Doctrine 
The need for information is a continuing and recurring one 
in labor relations. Under existing practice generally, requested 
information is freely exchanged? 
Perhaps the information might not be supplied in quite the form 
desired, but it [will] be disclosed nonetheless, to the satisfac- 
tion of the party seeking disclosure. Indeed, there are many 
bargainers who, as a matter of policy, volunteer information 
even before a request, once its relevance has become apparent.1° 
This informal discovery often exists both where the basic dispute 
has gone to arbitrationl1 and where an unfair labor practice com- 
9. Jones, Blind Man's Buff and the NOW-Problems of Apocrypha, Inc. and Local 
711-Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargaining Disputes, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 586 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones I]. See also 0. FAIRWEATHER, P ACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
IN LABOR ARBITRATION 122 (1973). 
10. Jones I, supra note 9, a t  586. As Jones has stated: 
Sometimes parties choose not to seek disclosure of relevant bargaining in- 
formation. For example, there are some unions with no desire whatsoever to 
inhibit their bargainers by embarrassing them with the facts of the particular 
enterprise. As a bargaining gambit, they want no access to operational informa- 
tion other than that which is put on the bargaining table by the employer. 
Similarly, a number of employers prefer to remain ignorant of the internal 
affairs of unions representing their employees. The [NLRA] reinforces the 
latter forbearance, by barring employer "interference" in the internal affairs of 
unions. NLRA § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1964). It is important to recog- 
nize, however, that many employers would have it  no other way, both as a 
matter of self-interest in effective bargaining and as a reflection of basic mana- 
gerial philosophy, quite aside from the statutory policy. 
Id. a t  n.52. 
Jones has also observed: 
It is quite common for an arbitrator [or administrative law judge] to sug- 
gest, in the course of the morning['s arbitration or NLRB hearing], what we 
might call, rhetorically, "lunchbreak discovery": "Why don't you dig that out 
during the lunchbreak and make it  available?" The parties general [sic] com- 
ply and disclosure is routine when the hearing resumes after luncheon. 
Jones, The Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration-The Example of Arbitral 
Discovery, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 830, 842 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones II]. For a 
discussion of hearing-by-interval as a discovery substitute, see note 68 and accompanying 
text infra. 
11. In arbitration, formal prehearing discovery is very limited. 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra 
note 9, a t  121. Since arbitration is widespread (the current Bureau of National Affairs 
sample analysis of 400 agreements reveals that 96 percent contain arbitration procedures, 
[I9751 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING EGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) 51:6), it is perhaps 
surprising that discovery clauses are not found more frequently in collective bargaining 
848 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
plaint has been issued.12 Unfortunately, informal discovery has 
not been satisfactory in every instance. 
Formal discovery in NLRB adjudication is "stringently lim- 
ited."13 With the issuance of the unfair labor practice complaint, 
discovery issues involve three parties: the respondent, the charg- 
agreements. See generally id. at 65:541-44. 
In a trilogy of articles, Professor Edgar A. Jones, Jr. has discussed the recurrence of 
discovery situations in labor relations, considered various aspects of arbitral discovery, 
and proposed a model of effective court, NLRB, and arbitrator interaction to remedy the 
need for disclosure. See Jones I, supra note 9; Jones II, supra note 10; Jones, The Labor 
Board, the Courts, and Arbitration-A Feasibility Study of Tribunal Interaction in Grieu- 
able Refusals to Disclose, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1185 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jones IITJ. 
Not all authorities favor arbitral discovery, however. See R. FLEMING, THE LABOR 
ARBITRATION PROCESS 62-63 (1965). Labor arbitrators seem chary in ordering discovery, 
perhaps because of uncertainties in their authoritjl to do so. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra 
note 9, at 125-31. 
12. Although the choice between pursuing arbitration or filing an unfair labor prac- 
tice charge, assuming the parties have this "andlor" option, may be influenced by a 
number of factors, an aggrieved party usually charges unfair labor practices and thus seeks 
to invoke an NLRB proceeding. This comment is based on the assumption that the parties 
choose, when a choice exists, this NLRB route. 
Arbitration clearly provides the faster adjudication of disputes over refusals to dis- 
close. See Jones I, supra note 9. See also SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 8 % ~  CONG., 2D SESS., EVALUATION CHARTS 
ON DELAY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 25, 41, 58, 70 (Comm. Print 1966); Jones III, 
supra note 11, at 1244-59. The inherent delay in Board proceedings may lead to a loss of 
the charging party's prestige and have serious economic consequences. On the other hand, 
the charging party enlists the skills and resources of the General Counsel's office. Jones I, 
supra note 9, at 593. These skills and resources are, in theory but not in practice, free to 
the charging party. Id. a t  n.62. In view of these factors, the decision to arbitrate or file a 
charge requires the aggrieved party to balance the costs and benefits of both alternatives. 
Even when the parties pursue NLRA remedies by invoking NLRB proceedings, the 
Board may in certain cases defer action to arbitration. The Supreme Court has indicated 
a clear preference for dispute resolution by arbitration rather than by the courts, at  least 
where the contract contains an arbitration provision. See United Steelworkers v. Enter- 
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. 
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) 
(the Steelworkers trilogy). 
In NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), the Court upheld the Board in 
interpreting a disputed, arbitrable contract and in determining that the employer had a 
statutory obligation to furnish certain requested information. The result seems to be that 
the Board may require disclosure of information where there is a statutory duty to disclose 
and need not defer to arbitration even if the controversy over disclosure is expressly 
arbitrable. Consequently, the NLRB has consistently refused to defer to arbitration in 
right-to-information cases subsequent to Acme Industrial. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW 504 (C. Morris ed. 1971) and cases cited. However, the Board has chosen to defer to 
arbitration refusal-to-disclose cases where (1) the contract contains express disclosure 
provisions or expressly waives the right to such information, and (2) the dispute arguably 
is covered by the grievance-arbitration provisions of the contract. See THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW 86 (K. Hanslowe, L. Cohen, & E. Spelfogel eds. 1973 Supp.). 
13. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, [I9761 4 LAB. L. REP. (79 Lab. Cas.) 1 11,587, 
at 21,555 (D. Kan. June 18, 1976). 
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ing party, and the General Counsel.14 This section explores the 
formal discovery methods currently available to these three par- 
ties in unfair labor practice proceedings and examines the limita- 
tions of each avenue. 
I .  Discovery between bargaining parties 
It is argued by some that all discovery devices authorized by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available in NLRB adju- 
dications. This argument is based on an interpretation of the 
Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA which provide that any 
unfair labor practice proceeding "shall, so far as practicable, be 
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to 
the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil 
procedure for the district courts . . . ."I5 This argument has been 
accepted by the Fifth Circuit19ut has been rejected by five oth- 
ers.17 There is no indication, however, that the Fifth Circuit's 
acceptance of this argument has led to full discovery in practice 
in that jurisdiction. 
In actual practice the discovery devices available to the bar- 
gaining parties are extremely limited. Of the traditional means 
of discovery authorized by the federal rules, only limited deposi- 
tions are permitted under the current NLRB rules.18 The Board's 
deposition rule allows oral depositions upon proper written appli- 
cation, but only after the complaint is filed and before the case 
14. Intervenors could also be included. See 29 C.F.R. 6 102.29 (1976). 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). See 29 C.F.R. 6 102.39 (1976). 
16. See NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968); 
NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273,276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
955 (1967); cf. McClain Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187, 189 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd 
on other grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974) (argument accepted by district court in 
Sixth Circuit). 
17. See NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 694 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. 
Ct. 77 (1976); D'Youville Manor, Lowell, Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 
1975); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th 
Cir. 1951); cf. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377, 377 n.2 (1951), enforcement 
denied on other grounds, 196 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1952) (argument rejected by Board). 
18. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1976). The federal rules provide for discovery by depositions, 
written interrogatories, and requests for admissions, physical and mental examinations, 
production of documents and things, and entry upon land. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). NLRB 
rules provide for three procedural devices that are tangentially related to discovery: (1) 
prehearing conferences, 29 C.F.R. § 102.35(g) (1976); (2) subpoenas, 29 C.F.R. § 102.31 
(1976); and (3) summary judgments, 29 C.F.R. 6 102.24 (1976). For a discussion and 
criticism of these rules, see 1  COMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CON- 
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 558-60, 590-91, 640 (1971). 
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is transfered from the administrative law judge to the Board." No 
provision is made for other types of depositions that might be 
beneficial to the resolution of labor disputes, e.g., depositions 
upon written questions, depositions before the charge is filed or 
complaint issued, or depositions subsequent to the Board's deci- 
sion but prior to enf~rcement .~~ 
The literal language of the Board's rule does not expressly 
preclude the use of depositions for discovery purposes, but the 
Board and the courts have consistently ruled that use of deposi- 
tions is limited to the securing of evidence for the adjudicatory 
hearing. For example, in NLRB u. Interboro Contractors, I n ~ . , ~ l  
the Second Circuit expressly rejected the notion that the NLRB's 
deposition rule permitted depositions for discovery purposes. The 
court upheld the Board's interpretation that the rule was in- 
tended only to preserve evidence when there was reason to believe 
a witness would not be present at the hearing. 
These limitations on discovery produce hardships on parties 
properly seeking discovery and unjustifiable excuses for parties 
avoiding discovery. Further, when a primary need for information 
is central to the resolution of the parties' dispute, access or lack 
of access to the information may be determinative of the whole 
case or issue. To ameliorate this potential harshness, the Board 
allows an unfair labor practice proceeding to force disclosure. An 
unfair labor practice charge may be filed for the express purpose 
of forcing a party engaged in collective bargaining to disclose 
certain information in his possession. The charge generally is that 
the refusal to disclose constitutes an unfair labor practice. 
The NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer or a labor organization to refuse to bargain collec- 
t i ~ e l y . ~ ~  The NLRB and the courts have long held that this duty 
19. The application must set forth the reasons why the deposition should be taken, 
the name and address of the witness, the subject matter of the expected testimony, the 
time and place of the deposition, and the identity of the officer before whom the deposition 
will be taken. The application must show good cause and must be addressed to the NLRB 
regional director prior to the hearing or to the administrative law judge during or subse- 
quent to the hearing. If ordered by the regional director or the administrative law judge, 
the deposition may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths by law in 
the United States, before certain American diplomatic personnel in foreign countries, or 
before any person agreed upon by the parties. 29 C.F.R. 5 102.30 (1976). 
20. Once a petition for enforcement or review is filed with the court of appeals, the 
federal discovery rules may apply to the enforcement proceeding. See note 58 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
21. 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971). 
22. 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1970): 
(a) It  shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- 
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to bargain collectively includes a duty to supply the other party 
with information that is necessary and relevant to proper bar- 
gaining, as well as with information needed for effective adminis- 
tration of an agreement already in force.23 
The scope of a union's duty to disclose is still an unresolved 
q~estion;~' it is clear, however, that an employer has such a duty. 
This duty is based on the belief that the information is necessary 
for proper and intelligent performance of the union's duty of 
effective representation of the employees." The union's right to 
information may, however, be relinquished, either by "clear and 
unmistakable" language in the agreement26 or by subsequent 
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees, subject to the provision of section 159(a) of this title. 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- 
. . .  
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is 
the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 
159(a) of this title . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970): 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar- 
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, 
shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employment . . . . 
23. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. 
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 309-22 (C. Morris ed. 
1971); Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A 
Study of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 
23 (1972); Di Fede, Employer Duty to Disclose Information in Collective Bargaining, 6 
N.Y.L.F. 400 (1960); Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish Information During the Contract 
Term, 9 GA. L. REV. 375 (1975); Gamey, Rehearing Discovery in NLRB Proceedings, 26 
LAB. L.J. 710 (1975); Manoli & Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discov- 
ery Procedures, 18 AD. L. REV. 9 (1966); Sherman, Employer's Obligation to Produce Data 
for Collective Bargaining, 35 MINN. L. REV. 24 (1950); Comment, Employers' Duty to 
Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (1957); Note, A 
Union's Right to Company Information for Use in Collective Bargaining-The Ninth 
Circuit Approach, 4 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 362 (1973); Comment, Discovery Before the National 
Labor Relations Board-An Unexpanded Concept, 12 S. TEX. L.J. 112 (1970). 
24. Only passing discussion has been given to the union's duty to supply the employer 
with information. See note 23 supra. NLRB member John H. Fanning has stated that he 
knows of no union refusal-to-disclose cases. Fanning, supra note 23, at 381. See also Jones 
II, supra note 10, a t  837 11-26. But see Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB. 
L. REP. (1975-76 NLRB Dec.) 7 16,814 (May 28, 1976). 
25. Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537,1538, enforced per curium, 217 F.2d 593 
(4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955). 
26. See International News Sem. Div. of Hearst Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1070 
(1955); California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436, 1439 (1952). 
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union actions during the bargaining process.27 Once the union has 
made a good faith demand for relevant information that should 
be disclosed, the employer must furnish it without undue delay." 
Unwarranted piecemeal or dilatory disclosure constitutes a re- 
fusal to bargain in good faith.29 
Employers' contentions that the requested data is confiden- 
tial or privileged have uniformly been rejected." In Aluminum 
Ore Co. u. NLRB,31 the Seventh Circuit stated: 
[ w e  do not believe that it was the intent of Congress in 
[passing the NLRA] that ,  in the collective bargaining pre- 
scribed, the union, as representative of the employees, should be 
deprived of the pertinent facts constituting the wage history of 
its members. We can conceive of no justification for a claim that 
such information is confidential. Rather i t  seems to go to the 
very root of the facts upon which the merits were to be resolved. 
For similar reasons, arguments that divulgence of information 
would violate employees' rights of privacy have not been ac- 
~ e p t e d . ~ ~  
NLRB cases involving charges that an employer is refusing 
to bargain, or is bargaining in bad faith, by declining to disclose 
generally fall into two categories: (1) cases involving wage data,33 
i.e., information concerning employees' incomes and fringe bene- 
fits and the method by which they are established, and (2) dis- 
putes concerning financial data,34 i. e., data basically relating to 
27. See Square D Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 1964). 
28. E.g., NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260,264-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 834 (1963). 
29. Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244, 1246-47 (1950). 
30. See, e.g., Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 223 F.2d 58, 59 (1st Cir. 1955); NLRB 
v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955). 
31. 131 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942). 
32. See, e.g., Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 575, 576 (2d Cir. 
1956); Northwestern Photo Engraving Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 24, 48 (1962). But see NLRB v. 
Winter Garden Citrus Prods. Coop., 260 F.2d 913, 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1958). 
33. The wage data category includes lists of names and addresses of employees, lists 
of wage rates, piecework rates, and hours worked, seniority lists, linked wage data, over- 
time data, incentive wage plan data, standards for computing merit pay increases, job 
classifications and descriptions, retirement and pension plan data, welfare plan data, 
profit sharing plan information, group insurance data, wage histories, lists of employment 
dates, and time studies used to determine wage rates. See generally sources collected in 
Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 
COLUM. L. REV. 112, 112-14 (1957); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 880, 905-14 (1965 & Supp. 1976). 
34. The financial data category includes, among other things, wage surveys, subcon- 
tracts data, information on orders, profit and loss statements, investment income data, 
lists of executive salaries, net sales data, lists of customers and competitors, and company 
books. See generally sources collected in Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic 
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the economic and financial condition of the employer, such as 
profits and production costs, especially when the employer makes 
a claim of financial inability to meet a union request during bar- 
gaining.35 The rules developed by the NLRB and the courts for 
dealing with discovery of wage data differ from the rules evolved 
for dealing with discovery of financial data. 
In determining the kinds of wage data that must be dis- 
closed, the NLRB and the courts initially required unions to 
prove the relevance of the requested material? This requirement 
was soon modified, however, when first the courts and then the 
Board adopted a rule that requested information was presump- 
tively relevant. In NLRB u. Yawman & Erbe Manufacturing 
CO.,~' the Second Circuit, enforcing an NLRB order to disclose, 
excused the union's failure to prove relevancy: 
Since the employer has an affirmative statutory duty to 
supply relevant wage data, his refusal to do so is not justified 
by the Union's failure initially to show the relevance of the 
requested information. The rule governing disclosure of data of 
this kind is not unlike that prevailing in discovery procedures 
under modern codes. There the information must be disclosed 
unless it plainly appears i r r e l e~an t .~~  
Then, in Whitin Machine Works,3v the Board, without citing 
Yawman & Erbe, adopted the presumptive relevance ruleU sug- 
gested by the Second Circuit. Simply stated, the rule is that the 
Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 112-14 (1957); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 
880, 914-17 (1965 & Supp. 1976). 
35. See Di Fede, supra note 23, at 402. The line between the two categories is an 
elusive one. Some information disputes are hybrid in nature and do not fall clearly into 
one category or the other. See Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for 
Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 113 n.7 (1957). This analysis will proceed 
as though the line were firmly drawn and the categories rigidly defined. 
36. See Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 23, at 24; Di Fede, supra note 23, a t  403; 
Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 
COLUM. L. REV. 112, 117-18 (1957). 
37. 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951), enforcing per curiam 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950). 
38. Id. at 949. 
39. 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 
905 ( 1955). 
40. The Board's adoption of the rule was clarified in two subsequent decisions in 1954. 
In Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1635, 1639 (1954), enforced, 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955), the Board adopted the trial examiner's report, which had 
relied on Yawman & Erbe in applying the presumptive relevance test. In Boston Herald- 
Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097, 2097-99 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955), 
the Board unequivocally adopted the test, citing Whitin, Yawman & Erbe, and Item. 
For a review of the development of the presumptive relevance rule, see Bartosic & 
Hartley, supra note 23, at 24-29. 
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union has a presumptive right to disclosure of certain in-unit 
wage data4' during contract negotiation and administration. The 
rationale for the rule was explained by Chairman Farmer in his 
concurring opinion in Whitin: 
[Tlhis broad rule is necessary to avoid the disruptive effect of 
the endless bickering and jockeying which has theretofore been 
characteristic of union demands and employer reaction to re- 
quests by unions for wage and related information. The un- 
usually large number of cases coming before the Board involving 
this issue demonstrates the disturbing effect upon collective 
bargaining of the disagreements which arise as to whether par- 
ticular wage information sought by the bargaining agent is suffi- 
ciently relevant to particular bargaining issues. I conceive the 
proper rule to be that wage and related information pertaining 
to the employees in the bargaining unit should, upon request, 
be made available to the bargaining agent without regard to is 
immediate relationship to the negotiation or administration of 
the collective bargaining agreement.42 
While the presumptive relevance rule has generally been 
applied to the disclosure of in-unit wage data, it has not been 
extended to out-of-unit wage data or financial data. In the land- 
mark financial data case of NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing C O . , ~ ~  
a union sought information concerning a company's financial 
condition after the company asserted during contract negotia- 
tions that it was not financially able to meet a requested wage 
increase. In affirming the NLRB's decision that refusal to supply 
such information was an unfair labor practice, the Supreme 
Court held that substantiation of the claimed inability to pay was 
req~ired. '~ This substantiation doctrine has been widely applied 
to cases involving requests for financial data whenever the em- 
ployer has injected financial inability as a bargaining issue." Ab- 
sent a claim by the employer of financial inability, however, it 
41. This includes individual earnings, job rates and classifications, merit increases, 
pension data, incentive earnings, piece rates, and the operation of the incentive system. 
Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 23, at 28-29, and sources there collected. 
42. 108 N.L.R.B. at  1541 (concurring opinion). 
43. 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
44. See id. at 152-53. 
45. See, e.g., Metlox Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 378 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1037 (1968); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 591, 592 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 852 (1966). 
For a treatment of the question whether decisions since Truitt have confused the 
substantiation doctrine and the presumptive relevance doctrine as they relate to the 
requirement that all "necessary and relevant" information be disclosed, see Bartosic & 
Hartley, supra note 23, a t  42-50. 
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appears that the union would be required to show both the ne- 
cessity and the relevancea of requested financial data. 
2. Discovery and the NLRB 
Different considerations come into play when the NLRB be- 
comes involved in discovery procedures during a Board adjudica- 
tion. Adjudications of unfair labor practice allegations are initi- 
ated by any individual or organization filing a charge with the 
NLRB regional director." After the charge is investigated, the 
regional director determines whether a complaint should be is- 
sued. The complaint, if issued, is prosecuted by the General 
C o ~ n s e l . ~ ~  The General Counsel has little need to use formal dis- 
covery devices; usually, all of the information the General Coun- 
sel needs to prosecute the complaint is supplied by the charging 
party or can be obtained by the regional director's investigation 
of the charge. 
The respondent or the charging party, however, may need 
information possessed by the NLRB. For instance, the respon- 
dent or potential respondent frequently desires access to state- 
ments and records acquired by the regional director during inves- 
tigation from interviews with persons knowledgeable with the 
charges.4g Access is sought for the avowed purpose of preparing 
46. Necessity and relevance are not mutually exclusive requirements. "Once rele- 
vance is determined, an employer's refusal to honor a request is a per se violation of the 
[NLRA]. Reasonable necessity for a union to have relevant data is apparent; necessity 
is not a separate and unique guideline, but is directly related to the relevance of the 
requested data." Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Div. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 
69 (3d Cir. 1965). 
47. NLRB unfair labor practice procedure is generally outlined in 29 C.F.R. $ 4  101- 
02 (1976). 
48. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 832-33 (C. Morris ed. 1971): 
Under the Wagner Act, agents of the Board itself investigated charges, 
issued complaints, and prosecuted the complaints. Hearings were conducted by 
trial examiners, but their decisions were frequently reviewed by supervisors 
prior to issuance and, a t  the Board level, by a Review Section rather than by 
attorneys reporting directly to Board members. 
To satisfy widespread criticism of this sytem, the Taft-Hartley amend- 
ments . . . established an independent General Counsel with final authority 
over investigation of charges, issuance of complaints, and prosecution of cases 
before the Board. In addition, trial examiners were freed from supervisory influ- 
ence over their decisions and were forbidden to consult with the Board about 
exceptions to their rulings. The Review Section was abolished . . . . 
(The title "trial examiner" was changed to "administrative law judge" in 1972. 37 Fed. 
Reg. 16,787 (1972).) The General Counsel has delegated the investigative and complaint- 
issuance functions to the NLRB regional directors. 
49. The regional director utilizes members of the field staff to do the investigative 
work but retains control over the investigation and may dispense with unnecessary por- 
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defenses to the charges.50 Access to these statements, however, is 
permitted under NLRB rules only after the person making the 
statement has testified a t  the hearing. Even then, access is lim- 
ited by requirements that only those portions of the statement 
relevant to the subject matter of the testimony need be disclosed 
and that the statement must be signed or otherwise approved by 
the witnessa51 As a result of these severe restrictions, access to 
witness statements is almost nonexistent. 
In addition to the limited discovery available under NLRB 
rules, another possible method of obtaining information from the 
Board or the General Counsel is by use of the Freedom of Infor- 
mation Act (FOIA).52 Since 1967, when the FOIA became effec- 
tive, numerous attempts have been made to utilize its provisions 
to secure witness statements and other information in the 
NLRB's posses~ion.~~ The Supreme Court has noted, however, 
that discovery for the benefit of private litigants is not one of the 
express purposes of the FOIA,54 and parties in Board proceedings 
generally have been unsuccessful in invoking the FOIA as a dis- 
covery tool .55 
tions. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1976). The investigation is acknowledged to be on behalf of the 
General Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970). 
50. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant in a federal criminal case is entitled, once a prosecution witness has testified, 
to all prior statements by that witness touching the events and activities to which testi- 
mony was given. The basis of the decision was the notion that access to such statements 
was necessary because of their impeachment value during cross-examination. In NLRB 
v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403, 406-08 (2d Cir. 1958), the Second Circuit held 
"Jencks-type" discovery to be required in NLRB proceedings. The Board thereafter 
amended its rules in order to conform. See 29 C.F.R. Q 102.118 (1976); discussed in 
Alleyne, The "Jencks Rule" in NLRB Proceedings, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 891 
(1968); cf. Ra-Rich Mfg. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 701-02 (1958) (NLRB acquiescence to 
Jencks rule). 
51. 29 C.F.R. 8 102.118 (1976). If the General Counsel elects not to comply with an 
administrative law judge's order to disclose, the only apparent sanction is striking the 
witness' testimony. 
The Board's rules generally prohibit any NLRB employee from producing information 
in the Board's possession, whether in response to a subpoena or otherwise, without the 
written consent of the NLRB. Id. 
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a treatment of the federal FOIA as a 
discovery device in judicial proceedings, see Adams, The Freedom of Information Act and 
Pretrial Discovery, 43 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1969); Note, The Federal Freedom of Information 
Act as an Aid to Discovery, 54 IOWA L. REV. 141 (1968). 
53. Garvey, supra note 23, a t  710. 
54. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. 
v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). 
55. See Roger J .  Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.8d 80, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1976); Title 
Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 98 (1976); 
Marathon LeTourneau Co., Marine Div. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (S.D. Miss. 
1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Capital Cities 
8451 NLRB DISCOVERY PRACTICE 857 
Another avenue of discovery is sometimes available when- 
ever the Board is a party in a federal court action. When this is 
the case, the other parties may obtain information from the 
Board or the General Counsel by direct application of the federal 
discovery rules.56 For example, these provisions may be utilized 
when (1) an FOIA action is brought against the Board in district 
court, (2) the Board seeks a district court injunction under the 
NLRA,57 (3) the Board seeks to enforce its order by petition to a 
court of appeals pursuant to the NLRA,58 or (4) the Board seeks 
Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971,976-77 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Local 30, AFL- 
CIO v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976); NLRB v. Biophysics Syss., Inc., 78 
Lab. Cas. 20,781 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1976); Fuselier & Moeller, NLRB Investigatory Re- 
cords: Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 541 (1976). 
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 404 (1960) (discovery by 
Board allowed in contempt proceedings); NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 408 F.2d 803 
(5th Cir. 1969) (discovery permitted before master to hear contempt proceedings); Speran- 
deo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381,384 (10th Cir. 1964) (subpoena duces tecum 
allowed against regional director in injunction action); Madden v. Milk Wagon Drivers 
Local 753, 229 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (limited discovery permitted in injunction 
proceeding); Fusco v. Richard W. Kasse Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962) 
(limited discovery permitted in injunction proceeding); Note, Labor Law-Discovery Pro- 
cedure Prior to Institution of Contempt Proceedings, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 286 (1958); cf. 
Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960) 
(direct district court action seeking declaratory judgment of employer's right to inspect 
affidavits in Board's possession dismissed for want of jurisdiction). 
57. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970): 
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging that 
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition 
any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor 
practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides 
or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon 
the filing of any such petition the court . . . shall have jurisdiction to grant to 
the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper. 
The NLRA provides, in cases involving certain union unfair labor practices, that if 
there is reasonable cause to believe the unfair labor practices charges to be true, the 
investigating officer 
shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within 
any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged 
to have occurred, or wherein such person [charged] resides or transacts busi- 
ness, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the 
Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the 
district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary 
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provi- 
sion of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be 
issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable 
injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining 
order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the 
expiration of such period. . . . 
29 U.S.C. 4 160(1) (1970). 
58. 29 U.S.C. 5 160(e) (1970): 
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United 
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a civil contempt decree in a court of appeals after the Board's 
order has been enforced but not obeyed. This discovery avenue, 
however, is at best quite limited because of the extraordinary and 
restricted nature of federal judicial intervention in labor rela- 
tions. 
A final discovery alternative is that of compelling discovery 
by a bill of  particular^.^^ Such a bill is possible under the Board's 
unlimited motion p r a c t i ~ e . ~  The NLRB has been reluctant to 
furnish bills of particulars for the same reasons it has opposed 
discovery generally." Judge Learned Hand has characterized 
these bills as being "of slight value in a trial by hearings at inter- 
val~,"'~ such as NLRB  adjudication^.^ Bills of particulars are of 
limited utility since their purpose is to increase the specificity of 
the charges." Consequently, employers and unions have made 
little use of them? 
11. THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN NLRB DISCOVERY 
As discussed above, discovery is severely restricted in NLRB 
States . . . for the enforcement of [the Board's] order and for appropriate 
temporary relief or restraining order . . . . Upon the filing such petition, the 
court . . . shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question 
determined therein . . . . 
The NLRA also permits any person aggrieved by a Board order to petition a court of 
appeals for review of the order. The court of appeals proceeds on such review petitions as 
it does enforcement petitions under § 160(e). 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970). 
59. In common law practice, a bill of particulars is "[a] written statement or specifi- 
cation of the particulars of the demand for which an action at  law is brought . . . fur- 
nished by one of the parties to the other, either voluntarily or in compliance with a judge's 
order for that purpose." BLACK'S h w  DICTIONARY 212 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
The corresponding equitable bill of discovery seems never to have been applied to 
labor relations. This may be because the merger of law and equity has removed the fine 
distinction between the two bills. For cases in the nature of a bill of discovery, see McClain 
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974) and Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 
280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, 
ADMINISTEUTIVE LAW§ 98 (1976); Deuelopments-Discovery, supra note 3, a t  946-51. 
60. See 29 C.F.R. 6 9  102.24-28 (1976). 
61. See Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 295 (1960), enforced 
per curium, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961); Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local 100, 128 
N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960), enforced per curium, 291 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1961). 
62. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862,873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U S .  
576 (1938). 
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.43 (1976). 
64. In this sense they are analogous to motions for more definite statements in civil 
practice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). 
65. But see NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 591 
(5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Automotive Textile Prods. Co., 422 F.2d 1255, 1256 (6th Cir. 
1970), enforcing per curiam 171 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1968); North American Rockwell Corp. v. 
NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Associated Naval Architects, Inc., 
355 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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adjudications. Except for the burdensome and slow process of 
filing an unfair labor practice charge, parties attempting to sat- 
isfy their primary needs for wage or financial data during collec- 
tive bargaining and contract administration find little discovery 
to be available. This limited discovery is especially evident when 
subsidiary needs for information are involved. Similarly, in prac- 
tice there is almost no discovery available against the NLRB 
under federal statutes or federal or Board rules. 
Despite these restrictions on NLRB discovery, it has been 
argued that adequate discovery already exists in NLRB adjudica- 
tions. This argument is usually propounded in one of four forms: 
(1) the NLRA makes at least part of the federal discovery rules 
applicable to NLRB adjudications;" (2) bills of particulars are an 
effective discovery alternative in Board proceedings;"(3) trial-by- 
interval, which is possible under the Board's rules," allows res- 
pondents to adequately prepare their defenses during continu- 
ances, alleviating the need for prehearing discovery; or (4) the 
provisions made in the present Board rules for  deposition^^^ and 
production of witness statementsT0 are sufficient. As has been 
noted above, however, the severe limitations on these discovery 
alternatives allow no "real opportunities for dis~overy."~~ The 
need for discovery in NLRB adjudications is illustrated by the 
following fact situations. 
Fact Situation # I .  Employee A has filed a charge and the 
NLRB regional director has issued a complaint alleging that em- 
ployer X has engaged in unfair labor practices in discharging A. 
B, A's former supervisor, reports to X's management that A was 
fired because he was strongly implicated in thefts of X's property. 
A asserts that he was discharged solely because of his union activ- 
ities. X has reason to believe that A and other employees have 
given statements to Board investigators, but all current employ- 
ees deny this and refuse to discuss the incident. In order to pre- 
pare a defense, X would like to verify the existence and examine 
66. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra. 
67. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra. 
68. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.43 (1976) (granting discretion to administrative law judge to 
continue the hearing from day to day); cf., NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 
873 (2d Cir. 1938) (bill of particulars of slight value in trials-by-interval). 
69. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1976). 
70. 29 C.F.R. 4 102.118 (1976) (NLRB Jencks rule); see notes 49-51 and accompany- 
ing text supra. 
71. Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1056 
(1964). 
860 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
the contents of any such statements that the NLRB might pos- 
sess .72 
Fact Situation #2. Employer A and union B are engaged in 
negotiations toward a new collective bargaining agreement. B has 
demanded a flat 12 percent increase in the hourly rates of the 
machinists B represents. A contends that it is unable to meet 
such a demand because of recent financial setbacks. A also as- 
serts that the results of an industry-wide wage survey indicate 
that A's employees are already the best paid in the business. In 
order to represent its constituent employees effectively, B would 
like to have access to A's books and wage survey in order to verify 
A's claims.73 
Recognition that these and other fact situations demonstrate 
that valid discovery needs exist has inspired numerous calls for 
NLRB adjudicatory discovery.74 In one oft-quoted passage, the 
Fourth Circuit observed that "the Board, acting in a quasijudicial 
capacity as it does, should freely permit discovery procedure in 
order that the rights of all parties may be properly prote~ted."'~ 
The failure of the Board to permit discovery, it is said, 
"complicates litigation and discourages ~ettlements."~'Vi 
"thorough review" of the Board's present position has been 
Administrative procedure study groups have consistently 
advocated administrative d i s c ~ v e r y . ~ ~  Indeed, the permanent 
72. In current NLRB practice, access to these statements is possible only through the 
inadequate NLRB Jencks rule. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra. 
73. Under current Board law and doctrine, access might be obtained only through the 
mechanism of filing an unfair labor practice charge and prosecuting a complaint unless 
A agrees to permit access. See notes 22-46 and accompanying text supra. Obviously, this 
is an ineffective discovery alternative. 
74. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 119761 4 LAB. L. REP. (79 Lab. Cas.) 
1 11,587 (D. Kan. June 18, 1976) (court in FOIA action "shocked" by stringent limits on 
NLRB discovery); Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB. L. REP. (1975-76 
NLRB Dec.) 7 16,814 (May 28, 1976) (Murphy, Chmn., dissenting); Jenkins, supra note 
3, a t  101. It is interesting to note that member Jenkins did not join in Chairman Murphy's 
dissent in Tool & Die Makers'. 
75. NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965). 
76. Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law-A Preliminary Paper, 35 J .  AIR L. & 
COM. 537, 559 (1969). 
77. 36 Mo. L. REV. 537, 544 (1971); see Garvey, supra note 23, a t  723. 
78. In 1941 the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure recog- 
nized that the purposes served by discovery were also applicable to formal administrative 
proceedings and recommended certain prehearing procedures. COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE APPOINTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN- 
MENT AGENCIES, . DOC. NO. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1941). In 1953 a subcommittee of 
the Presidential administrative procedure conference was "fragmented" over discovery 
and failed to agree on a report. Discovery in Administrative Proceedings, 14 FED. COM. 
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Administrative Conference of the United States has formally rec- 
ommended that private parties to adjudicatory proceedings 
"have equal access to all relevant, unprivileged information at 
some point prior to the hearing," and has proposed certain mini- 
mum standards to guide administrative agencies in adopting dis- 
covery rules." Congressional groups have also favored adminis- 
trative discovery.80 In fact, discovery-type rules have been 
adopted by several other administrative agencies.81 The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), in 1961, was the first major agency to 
adopt some sort of dis~overy.~~ In 1968, both the Federal Maritime 
B.J. 99, 100 (1955) (Committee on Pleadings, Chairman Rupert's report). The conference 
did, however, propose an illustrative rule for prehearing conferences. CONFERENCE ON AD- 
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FIRST REPORT 10-11, 24-28 (1953). In 1955 the second Hoover 
commission recommended that agencies conform with certain federal discovery rules. 
TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECU- 
TIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 197 (1955). 
In 1962 the interim Administrative Conference of the United States formally ap- 
proved the principle of administrative adjudicatory discovery and recommended that 
"each agency adopt rules providing for discovery to the extent and in the manner appro- 
priate to its proceedings." Recommendation No. 30, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
37 (1963). The report of the Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings of 
the Conference discussed the advantages attendant to broader administrative discovery 
and concluded that the adoption of discovery would promote fairness and reduce delays. 
Id. a t  115. 
79. 1 C.F.R. § 305.70-4 (1976). 
80. S. 1663, introduced by Senators Dirksen and Long in 1963 to amend the Adminis- 
trative Procedure Act, provided in part: "Depositions and discovery shall be available to 
the same extent and in the same manner as in a civil proceeding in the district courts of 
the United States except to the extent an agency shall find such conformity is impractica- 
ble and shall otherwise provide by published rule." Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Sub- 
comm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1964). The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure revised this section to read: "To the extent an agency shall find 
it practicable, depositions and discovery shall be available to the same extent and in the 
same manner as in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. a t  7. The full committee, 
however, failed to report out the bill, no doubt due to the more controversial nature of 
the bill's other provisions. 
Senators Dirksen and Long introduced a nearly identical bill in the next Congress. 
S. 1336,89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. Rm. 4090 (1965). This bill retained the substance 
of the original discovery provision of S. 1663. S. 1336 passed the Senate, 112 CONG. REC. 
13,739 (1966), but died in committee in the House. S. 1336 was reintroduced as S. 518, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 946, 951 (1967), but, like its predecessor, S. 1663, it 
failed to clear the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
81. For a general discussion of administrative discovery, see Berger, Discovery in 
Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up With the Courts, 46 
A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89; 
Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1964). 
82. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 578 (1971); see 16 C.F.R. ee3.31-.39 (1976). The FTC rules were broadened 
in 1967. For a discussion of the FTC rules, both before and after the 1967 changes, see 
Kintner, Discovery in Administrative Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 AD. L. REV. 233 (1964); 
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Commission (FMC)83 and the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion (FCC)84 responded to the Administrative Conference's rec- 
ommendation and adopted new discovery rules. Since then, the 
recommendation has been implemented in whole or in part by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),85 the now-defunct At- 
omic Energy Comrniss i~n,~~ the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission, and the Postal Rate Commi~s ion .~~  Limited 
discovery is available by rules of the Federal Power Cornmiss i~n,~~ 
the Civil Aeronautics Board,89 the Securities and Exchange Corn- 
mission,90 the Federal Reserve System,g1 the Foreign Claims Set- 
tlement Cornmis~ion,~~ the Federal Energy Admini~tration,'~ and 
the Federal Aviation Administrati~n?~ 
In addition to the facts that NLRB discovery has been widely 
advocated and that discovery rules have been adopted by many 
other administrative agencies, one potent argument in favor of 
adoption of NLRB discovery is that discovery would eliminate 
surprise in the adjudicatory process.g5 The Supreme Court has 
Mezines & Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L. REV. 55 
(1966); Rowe, Nicholson, & Lewis, Discovery Symposium-The Role of Discovery in Fed- 
eral Trade Commission Proceedings, 21 AD. L. REV. 439 (1969); Kintner, Recent Changes 
in Federal Trade Commission Discovery Practice, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 238 (1968); Stewart 
& Ward, FTC Discovery: Depositions, the Freedom of Information Act and Confidential 
Informants, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 248 (1968). 
83. 46 C.F.R. § § 502.201-.211 (1976). See 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1970), which was enacted 
to overrule FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964), criticized 
in Galland, A Note on Maritime Discovery, 19 AD. L. REV. 119 (1966). 
84. 11 F.C.C.2d 185 (1968), 47 C.F.R. $4  1.311-.325 (1976). The pre-1968 FCC rules 
are discussed in Note, The Lack of Discovery in Federal Communications Commission 
Proceedings-An Exercise in the Denial of Basic Fairness, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 328 
(1963). The 1968 rules are treated in Symposium-The FCC's New Discovery Procedures, 
22 FED. COM. B.J. 3 (1968). 
85. 49 C.F.R. §$ 1100.56-.68 (1976). 
86. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.740-.744, 3.206-.207 (1974). 
87. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1971-72 REPORT 33 (1972). 
88. 18 C.F.R. $0 1.23-.24 (1976). But see Ross, Discovery and the Federal Power 
Commission, 18 AD. L. REV. 177 (1966) (FPC rules said to approach federal discovery rules 
in scope). 
89. See 14 C.F.R. $8 302.19-.20, .23 (1976); cf. Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures 
Before the C.A.B., 18 AD. L. REV. 157 (1966) (discussing CAB discovery rules prior to 
implementation of the Administrative Conference's recommendation). 
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.15 (1976); cf. Frankhauser & Belman, The Right to Informa- 
tion in the Administrative Process: A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
18 AD. L. REV. 101 (1966) (discussing SEC discovery practice as of 1966). 
91. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 263.7-3 (1976). 
92. See 45 C.F.R. $9 501.2, .5-.6 (1976). 
93. See 10 C.F.R. $0 205.8, 303.8 (1976). 
94. See 14 C.F.R. $0 13.53, .57 (1976). 
95. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, [I9761 4 LAB. L. REP. (79 Lab. C a d  
fi 11,587 (D. Kan. June 18, 1976); Marathon LeTourneau Co., Marine Div. v. NLRB, 414 
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stated that discovery and other pretrial procedures "make a trial 
less a game of blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the 
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable ex- 
tent."" The purpose of eliminating surprise would be served by 
the adoption of liberal discovery rules by the NLRB. As the first 
fact situation above illustrates, the present lack of discovery in 
NLRB adjudications can lead to circumstances where the respon- 
dent to an unfair labor practice complaint may be seriously dis- 
advantaged in his preparation for adjudication and consequently 
may be confronted at  the hearing with new factual and legal 
issues for which he is inadequately prepared. Notions of basic 
fairnessg7 would indicate that the respondent and the General 
Counsel should have equal opportunities to prepare their cases. 
With the decline of the "sporting theory of justice,"g8 parties in 
civil actions have found discovery tools to be useful in trial prepa- 
ration; similarly, adoption of discovery rules by the NLRB would 
help equalize the ability of parties to Board proceedings to pre- 
pare their cases. 
Because of the inadequacy of present NLRB discovery and 
the need for discovery in Board adjudications, there is a distinct 
need for the Board to adopt discovery rules. The major considera- 
tion here is what form those rules should take. While original 
rules could be drafted for Board discovery,0% has been suggested 
that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
- - -  
F. Supp. 1074,1084 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 
F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
96. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
97. Elements of procedural due process are closely allied with notions of fairness. 
Thus, i t  may be argued that the Board's failure to allow formal discovery in unfair labor 
practice proceedings is a denial of due process. This argument has generally been rejected, 
however. See NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 
S. Ct. 77 (1976); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 823 (1961) (Board regulations on their face not violative of due process); NLRB 
v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951) (denial of deposition subpoena 
not violative of due process); Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 
296 (1960), enforced per curium, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961) (lack of Board rule for pro- 
duction of documents not a denial of due process); Plumbers & Steamfitters Union Local 
100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960), enforced per curiam, 291 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1961) 
(denial of bill of particulars not a denial of due process). But see McClain Indus., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 381 I?. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd on other grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 
1974). An in-depth procedural due process analysis, however, is wanting in all these 
decisions. 
98. One of the underlying purposes of the federal discovery rules is to escape from 
this sporting theory. Developments-Discovery, supra note 3, a t  1028. 
99. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 23. 
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dure be adopted.loO This comment is limited to discussion of the 
applicability of the federal rules. lo' 
111. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES TO 
NLRB PROCEEDINGS 
A. General Objections 
Several arguments have been raised against adoption of dis- 
covery rules by the NLRB. A general discussion of five of these 
arguments-intrusion, expense, formalization, abuse, and unique 
circumstances-is included a t  this point as a necessary preface to 
an analysis of the federal rules' specific applicability to Board 
proceedings. 
Some fear that expanded discovery will be overly intrusive 
into the affairs of labor and management. This apprehension is 
evidenced by decisions that limit the union's right to information 
concerning the employer's financial condition. In fact, elements 
of this misgiving may be found in almost every refusal-to-disclose 
case. Management may have justifiable concerns, for in many 
instances unions have attempted to secure, and occasionally have 
succeeded in securing, such data as executive salary lists, cus- 
tomer lists, company books, profitfloss statements, and other in- 
formation usually considered to be within the "management pre- 
rogative."lo2 The existence of the "internal affairs" doctrine em- 
bodied in the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for 
an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or ad- 
ministration of any labor organization,"lo3 illustrates that union 
leadership may also validly fear intrusion. 
I t  is doubtful, however, that this fear justifies a refusal to 
adopt discovery rules. Mere cries of potential intrusion carry little 
weight. The federal discovery rules implicitly recognize the prob- 
100. Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB. L. REP. (1975-76 NLRB Dec.) 
fi 16,814, at 27,771 n.7 (May 28, 1976) (dissenting opinion). 
101. Other sets of rules have been suggested for NLRB adoption. See 1 C.F.R. O 
305.70-4 (1976) (Recommendation 70-4 of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States); Gamey, supra note 23, a t  720-23. As a whole, the federal rules seem preferable to 
these other sets. Practitioners are familiar with the use of the federal rules, and extensive 
case law and commentary discussing and interpreting the rules exists. (Perhaps it is for 
these reasons that the Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation is similar 
in form to the federal rules.) Gamey's proposed rules may be criticized for their imbalance 
toward discovery by respondents and from the Board. 
102. See generally sources collected in Comment, Employers' Duty to Supply Eco- 
nomic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 112-14 (1957); Annot., 2 
A.L.R.3d 880, 905-23 (1965 & Supp. 1976). 
103. 29 U.S.C. # 158(a)(2) (1970). 
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lem of intrusion by providing exceptions for "privileged" mat- 
terslo4 and by allowing discovery to be terminated upon a showing 
of annoyance, embarassment, or oppression.lo5 If the federal rules 
were adopted without major change, protective orders would be 
available upon a proper showing of good cause;lo6 the Board and 
the courts would likely not be hesitant in granting such orders. 
A second fear is that discovery might require a party to make 
unreasonable expenditures. Although any use of discovery de- 
vices entails expense, the issue is whether the rule adopted would 
provide adequate protection against discovery imposing unrea- 
sonable expense. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
recognizing a policy designed to minimize litigation expense,lo7 
permits protective orders on a showing of "undue burden or ex- 
pense."lo8 Other rules provide for the shifting of expenses when 
one party is dilatory or u n c o ~ p e r a t i v e , ~ ~ ~  a solution that not only 
encourages disclosure, but also provides some relief for the party 
who is forced to go to great expense to produce evidence that is 
readily available to his opponent. Thus, it generally appears that  
the federal rules satisfactorily answer the threat of unreasonable 
expense in NLRB adjudications, absent a showing that the pecu- 
liar circumstances of NLRB proceedings require more stringent 
protection of the parties than the federal rules provide. 
Another frequently mentioned concern is that adoption of 
formal rules would inject an undesirable amount of legal formal- 
ity into what is otherwise a relatively informalllo procedure. Un- 
like the specters of intrusion and expense, the threat of formaliza- 
tion has no direct analog in civil actions; even summary disposi- 
tions of civil actions, through devices such as summary judgment, 
are formal in nature. The question, then, is whether adoption of 
discovery rules would formalize and complicate the NLRB adju- 
d ica tor~ process, and whether this formalization and complica- 
tion would be undesirable. 
The adoption of discovery rules actually may simplify, not 
complicate, the process. Such rules, it has been suggested, put 
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). 
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 30(d). 
106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
107. Jones 11, supra note 10, at 843. 
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(g), 37(a)(4), 37(b)(2), 37(c), 37(d). But see FED. R. CN. 
P. 37(f). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (rules to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action"). 
110. For a brief discussion of informal discovery in the collective bargaining process, 
see notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra. 
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the parties "in a frame of mind to settle."lll Early settlement of 
disputes would tend to expedite the process. Indeed, Justice 
Brennan has observed that perhaps discovery procedures are 
most needed in the small case where the detriment of formaliza- 
tion would presumably be felt the strongest.l12 
But assuming arguendo that some formalization would result 
if the federal discovery rules were adopted, there remains for 
discussion the question whether such formalization is indeed 
undesirable and unwarranted. The major concern voiced is that 
formalization might lead to delay in the adjudicatory proceed- 
ing.l13 Delay is of particular concern in labor-management contro- 
versies, where it has been said that "[tlime is of the e~sence.""~ 
Because of the susceptibility of NLRB proceedings to delay, it has 
been suggested that NLRB discovery should be more restricted 
than other administrative discovery.l15 On the other hand, pre- 
hearing discovery has been urged on administrative agencies as 
a device to shorten normal time spans in adjudication.l16 Thus, 
it is uncertain whether adoption of NLRB discovery rules would 
actually result in unwarranted delays in adjudications. 
111. Brennan, Introduction to the Problem of the Protracted Case, 23 F.R.D. 376,379 
(1958). 
112. Id.; Jones 11, supra note 10, a t  842. 
113. Delay has been termed the "nemesis" of discovery. Jones I, supra note 9, a t  572. 
Protracted delays are a "serious and notorious shortcoming in administrative procedure." 
Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035,1061-66 (1964); 
see, e.g., Fascell, Complexities and Delays in Administrative Procedures Must Be 
Eliminated, 46 A.B.A.J. 49 (1960); Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and 
Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49 A.B.A.J. 833 (1963); Prettyman, Reducing the Delay in Admin- 
istrative Hearings: Suggestions for Oficers and Counsel, 39 A.B.A.J. 966 (1953). See also 
SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
8 9 ~ ~  CONG., 2~ SESS., EVALUATION CHARTS ON DELAY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
(Comm. Print 1966). 
114. Hearings on S. 518 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Proce- 
dure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 229 (1967) (testimony 
of NLRB Chairman McCulloch) . 
115. See Discovery in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 
1064 (1964). 
116. Gallagher, Use of Pre-trial as a Means of Overcoming Undue and Unnecessary 
Delay in Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 44 (1959). Pretrial discovery in 
NLRB proceedings has likewise been advocated: 
Another factor which contributes to delay is the absence of pretrial discov- 
ery. Its availability would shorten the time required for hearings and probably 
lead to fairer trials and settlements. This has been the experience under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is nothing peculiar to the law under 
the National Labor Relations Act which would suggest a contrary result. 
Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal h b o r  Law-Concerning a Special- 
ized Article 111 Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 482 
(1972) (footnote omitted). 
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Another concern is the potential for abuse. Discovery might 
be misused to force injudicious settlements, to embarrass the 
adverse party, to delay the proceeding, to burden the parties with 
costs and inconveniences disproportionate to their interest in re- 
solving the dispute, to invade privileges, or to intrude into man- 
agement prerogatives and union internal affairsY7 While all of 
these potential abuses are present in some form in proceedings to 
which the federal discovery rules now apply, the fact is that abuse 
of these rules has been minimal. Safeguards have been built into 
the rules and counsel have exercised restraint in their use. Similar 
safeguards could be incorporated into any NLRB discovery rules, 
and no reason appears why counsel would not exercise similar 
restraint. 
Additional arguments have been raised that the unique cir- 
cumstances of labor relations and Board proceedings make dis- 
covery rules impracticable. One area of potential discovery abuse 
unique to the labor context is the intimidation of employees by 
employers. The misgiving here is that employers would identify 
by discovery and harass employees who gave evidence against 
their employers' practices to Board investigators or a t  hearings. 
Also, there is fear that the Board's investigative function might 
be impaired, since employees, knowing that their statements 
were freely discoverable, might be less candid in their disclo- 
sures.l18 Of course, prehearing statements of employees who ac- 
tually testify are available to employers for cross-examination 
The threat of intimidation of these witnesses would 
apparently be the same regardless of whether or not discovery was 
employed.120 
The rules could be drafted to include safeguards against po- 
tential reprisals. One suggested alternative is to incorporate into 
the proposed rules a rebuttable presumption that any subsequent 
detrimental change in the employment of a laborer who gave the 
Board information is retaliatory and itself an unfair labor prac- 
tice.121 With such a procedural safeguard, witness lists and state- 
ments could be made discoverable without impairing Board in- 
vestigations or subjecting employees to too great a risk of intimi- 
dation and harassment. 
A second area unique to NLRB proceedings is discovery in 
117. Jones 11, supra note 10, at 847. 
118. Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 1964). 
119. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra. 
120. See NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 408 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1969). 
121. See Garvey, supra note 23, at 718-23. 
868 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
the primary need situation. Although both primary and subsidi- 
ary needs for information exist, it should be recognized that the 
federal discovery rules are mainly designed to fulfill only subsidi- 
ary needs. Only rarely will a civil action be brought when the only 
remedy sought is disclosure of information by the other party.12* 
Primary needs are met either through nonjudicial means, or not 
at all. In labor law, however, primary needs have arisen suffi- 
ciently often to produce a large body of "NLRB common law" on 
the subject. 
The concern here is whether a body of rules developed to 
meet subsidiary needs for information between adverse parties 
may be transplanted into a field where primary needs arise more 
frequently. Arguably, the federal discovery rules would meet pri- 
mary needs too well, giving the charging party in a refusal-to- 
disclose case too much leverage in the bargaining process. Reason 
and experience suggest, however, that the Board and the courts 
would develop rules and doctrines that would insure continued 
balance in the negotiating process.123 
B. Analysis of Specific Discovery Provisions 
The federal discovery rules authorize depositions, interro- 
gatories, requests for admissions, physical and mental 
examinations, and requests for production of documents and 
things and entry upon land. The applicability to NLRB proceed- 
ings of these discovery devices as permitted by the federal rules, 
together with the possible sanctions for failure to make discovery, 
is discussed below. 
122. Obviously, FOIA actions are exceptions to the general rule. 
123. There are no obvious conflicts between the somewhat amorphous relevancy re- 
striction of the federal discovery rules and the relevancy doctrine that can be distilled from 
labor case law in refusal-to-disclose cases. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) and 8 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2008-09 (1970) with notes 36- 
42 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, the primary need cases rejecting claims of 
privilege are not in conflict with corresponding civil cases. 
Arguably, some primary need cases would be decided differently if the federal rules 
applied. For example, in Tool & Die Makers' Lodge No. 78, [I9761 5 LAB. L. REP. (1975- 
76 NLRB Dec.) f 16,814 (May 28, 1976), the Board refused an employer's request to order 
production of documents in the union's possession that the union claimed were dispositive 
of a grievable and arbitrable dispute. The Board distinguished other refusal-to-disclose 
cases by stating that they involved information which had been specifically identified, 
enabling the Board to make an initial determination of relevancy. Under the federal rules, 
the documents most likely would have been ordered disclosed because they were obviously 
germane to the subject matter of the unfair labor practice proceeding. Curiously, the 
Board's majority opinion failed to discuss the appropriateness of an in camera inspection 
of the documents, and the dissenters were unclear whether they favored such an inspec- 
tion. 
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1.  Depositions 
Probably the most widely utilized discovery device is the 
deposition. Even among administrative agencies with limited dis- 
covery rules its use is common.lz4 In fact, all seven major federal 
agencies permit the taking of evidence by some form of deposition 
procedure. 125 
The need for discovery depositions in NLRB adjudications is 
acute.lZ6 Although evidentiary depositions are presently allowed 
under NLRB practice,12' the Board has steadily refused to grant 
discovery depositions because of fears of harassment and intimi- 
dation of employees. Nevertheless, the availability and use of 
discovery depositions may actually protect employees from such 
risks if testifying at  a deposition is considered to be giving NLRA- 
protected testimony.128 With the addition of a presumption of 
retaliation if there are subsequent detrimental changes in a 
worker's employment, the federal rule for depositions upon oral 
examination, Rule 30, should effectively meet the need for NLRB 
discovery depositions. 
Rule 30 authorizes oral depositions, for discovery purposes. 
Leave of court is generally not a requirement for the taking of a 
deposition. The rule also provides for means of preserving objec- 
tions to the proceedings and terminating or limiting examinations 
"conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to 
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party."12' This pro- 
cedural safeguard, exercised upon motions to terminate or limit 
examination, should prove to be particularly useful in NLRB 
adjudications. 
However, two other federal rules relating to depositions need 
124. For example, depositions are authorized by the Federal Aviation Administra- 
tion, 14 C.F.R. E j  13.53 (1976); the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. 9 263.8 (1976); the 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 45 C.F.R. 0 501.5 (1976); and the Postal Rate 
Commission, 39 C.F.R. 0 3001.33 (1976). 
125. CAB: 14 C.F.R. § 302.20 (1976); FCC: 47 C.F.R. $0 1.315-.321 (1976); FPC; 18 
C.F.R. 0 1.24 (1976); FTC: 16 C.F.R. 0 3.33 (1976); ICC: 49 C.F.R. $ §  1100.58-.61 (1976); 
NLRB: 29 C.F.R. 0 102.30 (1976); SEC: 17 C.F.R. 8 201.15 (1976); see 46 C.F.R. 06  
502.202- .2O5 (1976) (FMC rules). 
126. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 603 (1971). 
127. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra. 
128. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 604 (1971); see NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972). The NLRA pro- 
vides that it is an unfair labor practice "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against 
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) 
(1970). 
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d). 
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not be adopted by the Board. Rule 31, authorizing depositions 
upon written questions, and Rule 27, permitting precomplaint 
and postdecision depositions, are both rarely used in civil prac- 
tice. Unless future experience by the NLRB showed otherwise, 
similar disuse could be expected of analogous NLRB rules. 
Rule 32, specifying the uses of depositions in court proceed- 
ings, should be adopted with appropriate modifications. Such a 
rule is necessary in a working discovery scheme in order to insure 
that both the evidentiary and discovery natures of depositions are 
preserved. 
2. Written interrogatories 
Perhaps the second most commonly used discovery tool in 
judicial proceedings is the written interrogatory. Rule 33 makes 
available the use of interrogatories by any party against any other 
party without leave of court. In civil practice, these interrogato- 
ries have proven useful, popular, and versatile.lsO Unlike the depo- 
sition, however, the interrogatory has had limited usage in ad- 
ministrative proceedings; of the major agencies, only the three 
with broad discovery rules patterned on the federal rules, the 
FCC, FMC, and ICC, permit written interrogatory practice.lsl No 
such provision is made in the NLRB rules. 
The adoption of an NLRB interrogatory rule raises two con- 
cerns. First, the use of interrogatories might cause significant 
delay in the adjudicatory process. Some delay would be inevita- 
ble, for it has been observed that a large organization may be 
unable to answer even a simple interrogatory in fifteen days,ls2 
but most delays could be avoided by clearly defining in the rules 
the time period during which interrogatories might be pro- 
pounded and perhaps by limiting the number of interrogatories 
that might be used.133 Second, interrogatories, while relatively 
inexpensive to draft, may impose considerable burdens on the 
130. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 123, a t  5 2163; Developments-Discovery, 
supra note 3, at 959. 
131. FCC: 47 C.F.R. § 1.323 (1976); FMC: 46 C.F.R. 4 502.206 (1976); ICC: 49 C.F.R. 
5 1100.62 (1976). 
132. Speck, supra note 3, at 1144. 
133. Such numerical limits could be set by the rules or be determined a t  a prehearing 
conference. Such a conference for the express purpose of considering the proper use and 
timing of discovery is authorized by the FCC rules. 47 C.F.R. 5 1.311(c)(l) (1976). How- 
ever, this purpose is apparently not served by prehearing conferences in current NLRB 
practice. See 32 Fed. Reg. 13,348 (1967) (NLRB prehearing conferences to immediately 
precede hearings). 
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answering party;ls4 thus, the temptation for their misuse is great. 
Misuse could be discouraged, however, if the Board and the 
courts were liberal in limiting discovery upon a proper showing 
of undue burden or expense, as the federal rules allow. 
These two concerns are outweighed by the utility of interro- 
gatories in aiding parties to prepare their cases. Administrative 
law practitioners have generally favored their availability be- 
cause they are easy to use.135 Written interrogatories are essential 
in an effective discovery scheme since they "provide a much 
needed vehicle for inquiring of another party about the existence 
and location of documents and other relevant evidence."136 Rule 
33 should be adopted by the Board because of its conciseness and 
proven workability. The adopted rule should allow interrogatories 
to be served on any party to the proceeding, including the General 
Counsel. ls7 
3. Other discovery devices 
Requests for admissions are permitted by the FCC,138 the 
FMC,lsV the FTC,140 and the ICC.141 The FTC experience has 
shown that a modest role is played by this device in administra- 
tive adjudications. Admittedly, requests for admissions are some- 
what cumbersome. Nevertheless, a rule on requests for admis- 
sions should prove useful in many cases where a prehearing con- 
ference is not necessary or would be wasteful in securing stipula- 
tions concerning facts, law, or the admissibility of evidence.142 
The federal rule on requests for admissions, Rule 36, should be 
134. Developments-Discovery, supra note 3, at 960. 
135. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 627 (1971). 
136. Id. 
137. The Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation suggested that in- 
terrogatories directed to the agency be permitted. 1 C.F.R. @ 305.70-4(4)(b) (1976). The 
interrogatory provision of the Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation is 
substantially similar to the federal interrogatory rule. Compare 1 C.F.R. 8 305.70-4(4) 
(1976) with FED. R. CIV. P. 33. Rule 33 also affords the option to produce business records 
whenever the answer to an interrogatory requires an examination or audit of such records 
and the burden of deriving the answer is substantially the same for either party. This 
provision should also be adopted by the Board, since, for example, a union's request for 
relevant information in an employer's possession sometimes may be met only by extensive 
compilations of employer's records. 
138. 47 C.F.R. 8 1.246 (1976). 
139. 46 C.F.R. 8 502.208 (1976). 
140. 16 C.F.R. 8 3.31 (1976). 
141. 49 C.F.R. 8 1100.63 (1976). 
142. 1. RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 632 (1971). 
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adopted without major modification because it is an effective, 
proven method for implementing this portion of discovery. As 
with written interrogatories, admissions should be allowed to be 
requested from the General Counsel. ld3 
Another discovery tool permitted by the federal rules is the 
physical or mental examination. No major agency has adopted a 
rule allowing this discovery device, and arguments against its 
adoption by the NLRB exist. Primarily, those arguments empha- 
size the possibility of abuse. Nevertheless, there are occasions in 
labor relations when a party has a legitimate need to inquire 
about the physical or mental condition of a party or a person in 
a party's control, as with an employer's concern with the health 
of an employee or former employee. In such situations, and upon 
good cause shown, the administrative law judge should be able 
to order the examination sought. Rule 35 appears to safeguard 
adequately the privacy rights of the person sought to be examined 
while recognizing that circumstances may warrant examinations 
and should, therefore, be adopted by the Board. 
Rule 34 authorizes discovery through requests for production 
of documents and things and for entry upon land. Rule 34 applies 
only to discovery between parties; production of documents or 
things in the possession of a nonparty apparently may be ob- 
tained only by serving notice to take the nonparty's deposition 
and then securing a subpoena duces tecum designating the docu- 
ments or things to be produced.ld4 The relevant portion of the 
Administrative Conference's discovery recommendation is simi- 
lar in major respects to Rule 34.1d5 The NLRB should adopt Rule 
34 because of its reasoned approach to the problems in this area. 
However, because of common employer resistance to union re- 
quests to come onto an employer's land to conduct time studies, 
to organize or inform employees, or to audit or examine the em- 
ployer's books or records, any rule adopted by the NLRB permit- 
ting entry could, for example, provide for entry by disinterested 
third parties rather than by the requesting partyl4"nd for the 
enforcement of express contract terms authorizing entry."' 
143. See 1 C.F.R. O 305.70-4(5)(b) (1976). 
144. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 34 with FED. R. CN. P. 45(b). 
145. Compare 1 C.F.R. 6 305.70-4(6) (1976) with FED. R. CN. P. 34. 
146. See Metlox Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 378 F.2d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 1967); Arthur A. 
Borchert, 90 N.L.R.B. 944, 953 (1950), modified and enforced per curium, 188 F.2d 474 
(4th Cir. 1951). A unique condition imposed by the ICC rules is that entry is permitted 
"subject to appropriate liability releases and safety and operating considerations." 49 
C.F.R. 6 1100.66 (1976). 
147. See J.B. Lion Corp., 66-3 LAB. ARB. AWARDS fl 8793 (1966) (Summers, Arb.). 
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4. Sanctions and their enforcement 
Rule 37 specifies the sanctions that a court may impose on 
parties or persons who fail to comply with discovery orders. Dis- 
obedience of an order compelling discovery may be penalized by 
the following additional court orders: taking as established dis- 
puted matters of fact, striking parts or all of pleadings, staying 
the proceeding, dismissing the action, rendering a default judg- 
ment, treating the failure to make discovery as contempt of court, 
and awarding reasonable expenses caused by the fai1ure.l" Such 
sanctions and orders compelling discovery are generally not ap- 
pealable since they are inter10cutory.l~~ In fact, the effectiveness 
of the federal discovery rules seems to lie in their nonappeal- 
ability; the trial court's decision is effective because of its practi- 
cal finality. 
Although varying in specifics, the FMC,lW the FTC,151 and 
the ICClS2 discovery rules expressly delineate the sanctions that 
may be imposed for failure to make discovery. These rules, pat- 
terned after Rule 37, provide that the administrative law judge 
may make rulings that (1) imply that the information sought to 
be discovered would have been adverse to the party, (2) take as 
established the matters regarding which discovery was sought, (3) 
block support or opposition to designated claims or defenses, (4) 
prohibit introduction of designated matters in evidence, (5) disal- 
low objections to the introduction and use of secondary evidence, 
(6) strike part or all of a pleading, (7) stay the proceeding, (8) 
dismiss the proceeding, or (9) render a decision against the party. 
All of the sanctions authorized by the FMC, FTC, and ICC rules 
seem appropriate for effective discovery in the administrative 
context. Their obvious advantage is that they are enforceable by 
the administrative law judge, the immediate overseer and arbiter 
of administrative discovery, without resort to the courts. This 
immediacy of enforcement and the limited appealability there- 
from are necessary for the effective operation of discovery. 
The Board should therefore adopt a sanction rule patterned 
on both Rule 37 and the FMC, FTC, and ICC rules. The NLRB 
rule should include a broad variety of possible sanctions. These 
148. FED. R. CN. P. 37(b). 
149. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 123, at 8 2006; Developments-Discoveiy, 
supra note 3, at 992. 
150. 46 C.F.R. 8 502.210 (1976). 
151. 16 C.F.R. 8 3.38 (1976). 
152. 49 C.F.R. 8 1100.67 (1976). 
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sanctions should be enforceable by the administrative law judge, 
and any appeal from his rulings should be carefully limited. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Forceful arguments exist for and against discovery rules in 
NLRB proceedings. The fears that expanded discovery will open 
the doors to intrusion, increased expense, formalization, and 
abuse are counterbalanced by the arguments that such discovery 
will reduce surprise, encourage settlement, and put the parties on 
more equal grounds, thus leading to fairer decisions. The resolu- 
tion of these conflicting arguments depends on an examination of 
the applicability of the rules proposed for adoption. In the case 
of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
dure, such an analysis shows, for the most part, that those provi- 
sions with slight modifications should be effective in meeting 
proper discovery needs in NLRB proceedings. 
